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Introduction 
 
 
Blocked for Good by the Threat of 
Treaty Change? 
Perspectives for Reform in the European Union 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
The European Union faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, pressure to reform 
its structures is growing. The hard negotiations with Greece in summer 2015 have revived 
the debate on deepening the Eurozone, while at the same time London is pushing to 
roll back integration, at least for itself. On the other hand, national governments reject 
any moves that would require a treaty change (such as transfer of powers) as politically 
impossible. Legal options for evading the dilemma and developing the Union by “covert 
integration” do exist, but these require unanimous political agreement among all the 
national governments – and would in the medium term require treaty changes to restore 
transparency and democratic legitimacy. 
 
The traumatic process of negotiating and 
ratifying the EU Constitutional Treaty and 
the Treaty of Lisbon has left deep marks. 
Ever since, national governments have con-
sistently avoided initiating significant treaty 
amendments, including at the height of 
the euro crisis. Even in projects such as the 
banking union, they have instead turned 
to treaties outside the EU framework. 
Despite this reservation – or perhaps 
precisely because of it – pressure to tackle 
reform of primary law is growing. Momen-
tum for a treaty amendment comes from 
three sides: Firstly, reform of the Eurozone 
remains on the agenda. Although indi-
vidual crisis-hit countries like Ireland have 
made progress and the Eurozone has 
bought itself some time for reform, the vola-
tile negotiations with Greece in summer 
2015 again spotlighted the persistence of 
grave deficits in its economic and political 
structures. In response, France in summer 
2015 proposed strengthening the Eurozone 
with a finance minister with a budget and 
a parliament of its own. Concurrently, in 
June 2015 the presidents of five European 
institutions (Commission, Council, ECB, 
Eurogroup and European Parliament) pub-
lished their conclusions on completing 
the economic and monetary union. While 
recommending short-term reforms under 
secondary law, in the longer term they also 
suggest creating a European finance minis-
try. If this were to involve transferring new 
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powers to the Eurozone within the frame-
work of the EU – such as rights to control 
or even intervene in national budgets, or 
new transfer mechanisms – regular treaty 
amendments would be required, under the 
principle of conferred powers that explicitly 
guarantees that only member states may 
transfer new powers to the Union. 
Secondly, British Prime Minister David 
Cameron is pursuing – in parallel to but 
not independently of the above – a reform 
serving British interests to convince his 
electorate and above all his party base to 
vote to remain in the European Union in 
the referendum planned for 2016 or 2017. 
The British demands also amount to reforms 
on a treaty-amending scale: exemption from 
the objective of an “ever closer Union”, 
greater rights for national parliaments, 
and safeguards for non-euro states in the 
process of closer integration of the Euro-
zone. Not least, Cameron is seeking to 
reduce the incentives for intra-EU migra-
tion to the United Kingdom. While not 
calling into question the principle of free-
dom of movement, this could require – 
depending on the specific interpretation of 
European law – amendments to the treaty 
provisions on free movement of persons or 
non-discrimination of EU citizens. Before 
the British referendum is held, the other 
member states will thus have to decide 
whether and to what extent they are wil-
ling to concede treaty-changing reforms. 
Thirdly, twenty-six of the twenty-eight 
member states have already agreed to seek 
a treaty amendment by 2017, having com-
mitted themselves to incorporate the pro-
visions of the Fiscal Compact into the EU 
treaties within five years of its coming into 
effect, in other words by January 2018 
(Article 16 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union). Given that this obli-
gation is binding only on the signatories, 
the corresponding treaty amendment is no 
foregone conclusion, because the two un-
involved states, the United Kingdom and 
Croatia, would also have to be persuaded 
to give their consent. 
Comprehensive Treaty Amendment 
Remains Out of Reach 
In all three areas, however, national govern-
ments appear to recoil from seeking treaty 
change. The reasons for this are complex 
and stem from more than just fear of refer-
endums. Fundamentally, the rejection of 
treaty amendments can be explained in 
terms of the interaction of six factors: 
Firstly, the greatest obstacle is that under 
Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) any form of treaty amendment must 
be agreed unanimously. This provision 
guarantees that the member states retain 
control over the EU treaties. And this is the 
reason why disagreements over treaty nego-
tiations have frequently led to the adoption 
of special arrangements and opt-outs to ac-
commodate individual member states. Now 
the differences between national govern-
ments are larger than ever. Whereas the 
Eurozone is at least debating a further deep-
ening, London would prefer to curtail or 
even reverse integration. The gap, however, 
is especially wide when it comes to ideas 
about the future of the Eurozone. These 
range from demands for greater sharing of 
risks (European unemployment insurance 
scheme, Eurozone budget) through further 
transfers of sovereignty (enhanced budget 
controls, binding reform programmes) to 
a return to market-driven reforms and a 
strengthening of the no-bailout clause. Acri-
mony between European states over the refu-
gee crisis has further worsened the political 
climate within the Union. 
Secondly, this also means that as soon as 
treaty reform comes onto the table in any of 
the European Union’s many pressing issues, 
the other questions almost automatically 
have to be debated and clarified too. For 
example, the United Kingdom would certain-
ly exploit any treaty reform initiated by the 
euro states to force a deal on its own issues, 
using its veto to add weight to its demands. 
The Union is thus unable to resolve any of 
its problems in isolation by the route of re-
form of primary law, but would be forced to 
tackle them as a whole. This naturally makes 
a solution considerably harder to find. 
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Thirdly, the situation is complicated 
by the fact that in a Union of twenty-eight 
member states there is almost always an 
important national election looming in one 
or another, which reduces the scope of the 
(larger) member states in negotiations. The 
debates about a political union in 2012 
were accompanied by warnings about that 
no treaty change was possible before the 
German Bundestag elections in 2013, in 
2013 it was the 2014 European elections, 
and then the British elections in 2015. 
And now, with German parliamentary and 
French presidential elections scheduled 
for 2017, there are again milestones before 
which treaty reforms are excluded. As these 
examples underline, national elections rep-
resent a structural rather than temporary 
obstacle, because many national govern-
ments believe that excessive willingness to 
compromise at the EU level reduces their 
prospects of re-election. 
Fourthly, the European Parliament must 
also be involved in any significant treaty 
change. While it would not be expected to 
fundamentally hinder any development of 
the Eurozone, there are certainly greater 
concerns about the British demands. Under 
Article 48 (3) of the TEU, simplified Treaty 
revisions are possible without a convention, 
but this shortcut requires the consent of 
the Parliament. Because a Convention grants 
considerably greater influence to the Euro-
pean Parliament (and national parliaments), 
it is quite likely that the Parliament would 
press for a Convention even for less signifi-
cant treaty amendments. 
Also for that reason, fifthly, the ordinary 
revision procedure suits neither the time-
table of the British strategy nor that of the 
Eurozone. The experience with the Treaty 
of Lisbon shows that more than half a dec-
ade may pass between the first talks (early 
2002) and entry into force (end of 2009). 
Even for the latest “simple” treaty amend-
ment – adding just one paragraph to Article 
136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) to ensure the 
validity of the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) – the member states required 
more than two years for ratification 
alone.     
Finally, every EU treaty amendment 
must be ratified by all member states. Plebi-
scites are not automatically necessary, but 
for political reasons a referendum is planned 
in the United Kingdom, and depending on 
the extent of transfer of sovereignty may 
also be required in Ireland, and on matters 
affecting non-euro states also Denmark. In 
the event of more significant treaty amend-
ments referendums could also be demanded 
in France, the Netherlands and elsewhere, 
following the precedent of the EU Constitu-
tional Treaty. Even parliamentary ratifica-
tion is likely to be more difficult than for 
the Treaty of Lisbon, because electoral suc-
cesses for EU-critical parties across Europe 
have boosted their representation in 
national parliaments. 
Option Covert Integration? 
The EU member states are in a bind: The 
Eurozone must be adapted and developed 
but the required major treaty amendments 
appear impossible. During the debt crisis 
the European Union therefore incremental-
ly developed a way around this problem that 
could be described as “covert integration”. 
The model is characterised by two mutu-
ally complementary features. Firstly, nation-
al governments delegate substantive politi-
cal decision-making powers that are not 
explicitly defined in the EU treaties to the 
EU level. This transfer of powers is then 
concealed, either by creating structures 
that can take decisions that might not be 
legally enforceable, but are politically bind-
ing. Alternatively, the competences are 
directly transferred to structures outside of 
the EU legal framework. The Fiscal Compact 
adopted in 2012, for example, did not rep-
resent any formal alteration to the EU trea-
ties. But the member states nonetheless 
agreed to include stricter budget rules in 
their national constitutions (or an equiva-
lent constitutional level) and introduced 
new monitoring and penalty systems. The 
possibilities for Brussels to influence na-
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tional budgetary policy were thus strength-
ened de facto – albeit not de jure. 
Secondly, these covert integration moves 
sidestep the processes required for a regu-
lar treaty amendment. The instruments 
applied here include generous interpreta-
tion of the EU treaties, separate treaties 
under international law, and inter-govern-
mental coordination. One example of this 
is the banking union, which only became 
possible through a combination of second-
ary legislation under a broad interpretation 
of the EU treaties and a supplementary 
treaty. Covert integration thus stands in 
contradiction to the purist line under which 
treaties should only be altered by a Con-
vention with the greatest possible legal 
security, transparency and democratic 
legitimacy. 
Another relevant instrument is differen-
tiated integration, without which no new 
integration move would have been agreed 
since the outbreak of the European debt 
crisis. In fact, every step involving less than 
the full twenty-eight members turns the 
Eurozone into the core of European inte-
gration (see SWP Research Paper 2/2013). 
Alongside the Fiscal Compact and the 
banking union, this also includes the new 
euro structures such as the Euro Summit 
with its own president and the European 
Stability Mechanism. Meanwhile, the 
Union’s actual supranational institutions, 
the Parliament and the Commission, on the 
other hand, are only peripherally involved. 
From the perspective of national govern-
ments, this concealment of transfer of 
powers has decisive advantages, and allows 
most of the obstacles to treaty amendments 
to be overcome in practice. Although all the 
named procedures still require unanimity, 
with differentiated integration it is suffi-
cient if all the participating member states 
agree. This also reduces the interdependency 
of the various reform initiatives, for example 
when the Eurozone avoids treaty amend-
ments and thus divests London of the veto 
it could use to press its demands. Above all, 
this approach allows the timeframe for 
reform projects to be significantly com-
pressed, by shortening the negotiations, 
and in particular the ratification process. 
The Fiscal Compact, for example, was nego-
tiated within three months, and was fast-
tracked into effect within nine months 
(even before all the parties had ratified). 
That was at least a year faster than any 
major EU treaty amendment since Maas-
tricht. Additionally, the lack of any formal 
transfer of sovereignty meant that national 
ratification referendums were avoided, 
with the sole exception of the Irish plebi-
scite on the Fiscal Compact. 
However, the disadvantages of covert 
integration are equally weighty. It violates 
important principles, whose observance the 
regular treaty amendment procedure with 
its high European and national hurdles is 
designed to guarantee. These are, firstly, 
transparency and democratic consultation 
guaranteed by a Convention, which fore-
sees participation by the interested public 
alongside the European and national parlia-
ments. Although integration steps such as 
the banking union and Fiscal Compact were 
not accomplished entirely behind closed 
doors, they permitted considerably less 
transparency and participation than a new 
Convention. 
Secondly, the referendums that are re-
quired in certain member states to approve 
transfer of sovereignty lend a treaty amend-
ment additional democratic legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public. Although it can be 
debated whether referenda are the right 
tool for deciding matters such as EU treaty 
revisions in the representative democracies 
of the European Union, the precedents mean 
that the legitimacy of any future major 
treaty revision will surely be measured by 
its popular approval, at least in certain 
states. Nobody has forgotten that citizens 
voted no in five of the fourteen national 
referendums on EU treaties since Maas-
tricht. 
Thirdly, in the longer term the present 
processes endanger legal clarity within the 
European Union as a community of laws 
whose legitimacy and stability also depend 
on the observance of principles such as that 
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of conferred powers. But if existing EU law 
is overloaded with contradictions created 
by a plethora of ancillary agreements or 
distorted by over-generous interpretations 
to push through integration steps, these 
practices will in the long term undermine 
the Union itself. 
Possibilities and Limits of 
Covert Integration 
Despite these reservations, national govern-
ments appear to regard the arguments 
against major treaty revisions as so weighty 
that – at least for the foreseeable future – 
reforms will be possible only via the diver-
sion of covert integration, if at all. In both 
neuralgic issues, namely the Eurozone and 
the United Kingdom, it is therefore neces-
sary to consider which options are possible 
under these preconditions, where their 
limits lie, and how they can in the longer 
term pave the way to a legally and above 
all politically viable reform. 
Options for the Eurozone 
It will certainly not be possible to overcome 
the complex political and economic chal-
lenges within the Eurozone solely or even 
largely through institutional reforms. None-
theless, all reform proposals that imply any 
transfer of new powers to the Union formal-
ly require a regular alteration of primary 
law. But in most cases a solution by the 
route of covert integration is conceivable, 
at least for a time, as long as a political con-
sensus can be reached beforehand. This can 
be illustrated with four proposals that are 
under discussion. 
Firstly, there are various ideas for strength-
ening economic governance within the 
Eurozone in order to reduce structural diver-
gences in the economic performance and 
competitiveness of the member states. These 
reform initiatives start from the diagnosis 
that the European debt crisis resulted from 
the weakness of individual member states. 
The five presidents’ report on Completing 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pro-
poses setting up national competitiveness 
authorities (requiring no treaty amend-
ment) and strengthening coordination 
of economic and fiscal policies between 
Eurozone states. In the same vein, some 
political leaders have contemplated grant-
ing a strengthened Commissioner for the 
Euro a veto over national budgets. Such a 
direct transfer of sovereignty would funda-
mentally require a treaty amendment, but 
binding bilateral treaties between the euro 
states and the Commission would be legally 
possible at any juncture. 
A second strand of reform initiatives is 
rooted in the diagnosis that mainly attri-
butes the Eurozone crisis to the fact that 
the common currency denies its members 
the possibility to devalue their currency 
or to borrow extensively in order to make 
major investments, limiting their ability 
to respond adequately to economic down-
turns. Addressing this issue in July 2015, 
French President François Hollande revived 
the proposal to give the Eurozone an addi-
tional fiscal capacity and a common unem-
ployment insurance. The Eurozone could 
then lend anti-cyclical support to member 
states in recession and thus reduce struc-
tural divergences. This would transform 
the character of the currency union, with 
the euro states sharing risks and assuming 
greater responsibility for one another. 
Nevertheless, there are possibilities to 
achieve this without a treaty amendment: 
the Eurozone states could, for example, 
apply the instrument of enhanced coopera-
tion in conjunction with Article 311 TFEU 
to introduce new own resources – for in-
stance in the form of Eurozone taxes that 
could then be used for instruments such as 
unemployment insurance. Even in this case, 
however, unanimity among the euro mem-
ber states would be required. 
Thirdly, the dramatic negotiations with 
Greece in summer 2015 have revived open 
discussion about whether and how a state 
could leave the euro, at least for a certain 
period. At first glance this would not appear 
to be covered by the aquis, because the 
introduction of the euro was “irreversible”. 
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The predominant opinion among experts 
in European law is therefore that an orderly 
exit procedure or an insolvency process for 
euro states would presuppose a regular 
treaty amendment. Nevertheless, the talks 
with Athens were accompanied by discus-
sion as to whether Greece could “tempora-
rily” leave the Eurozone – at its own request 
and with the consent of all the other EU 
member states – to restructure its debt. 
One option considered was to use Article 
140 TFEU to revoke the original decision 
to introduce the euro in Greece. While this 
alternative was ultimately not used in the 
talks in July and August 2015, it remains 
in the air in the longer term. 
Fourthly, almost all demands for greater 
powers for the Eurozone contain at least a 
declaration of intent to enhance its demo-
cratic legitimacy. The five presidents’ report 
calls for a strengthening of parliamentary 
control of decisions both on the national 
and the European level, including partici-
pation by the European Parliament in 
the European Semester. French President 
Hollande has even called for the creation 
of a Eurozone parliament. However, this 
could easily complicate the Union’s struc-
tures rather than improving their demo-
cratic legitimacy. On the other hand it is 
easily possible to expand the European 
Parliament’s role in economic governance 
with the help of regular EU legislation. 
Furthermore, its statutes would allow the 
Parliament to establish a special committee 
for the economic and monetary union with 
MEPs from the euro states. Via such a com-
mittee the European Parliament could 
directly represent the citizens of the euro 
states on matters concerning the euro. The 
national parliaments, too, could expand 
their coordination without a treaty amend-
ment, by using the Inter-parliamentary Con-
ference established under the Fiscal Com-
pact. 
This brief overview suffices to demon-
strate that the necessity for treaty amend-
ments is not absolute. Yet at the same time 
it reveals how contradictory the reform 
proposals for the Eurozone continue to be. 
Even by the route of covert integration, the 
monetary union can only be adapted and 
developed if at least the nineteen euro states 
can agree on common interests. Politically 
that would require all of them to make 
compromises that would be domestically 
controversial, if not explosive. 
A Danish Solution for the United Kingdom 
Negotiations with the United Kingdom 
will be similarly complex. With his target 
of a referendum by the end of 2017, Prime 
Minister David Cameron has set himself 
and the Union a clear deadline that more 
or less precludes achieving regular treaty 
change. Yet he still demands that reforms 
for the United Kingdom must be anchored 
in a permanent and legally binding form, 
in other words on the level of primary law. 
Thus alongside the substance of the talks 
with London (see SWP-Studie 4/2014), the 
EU partners will have to agree whether and 
how they wish to grant concessions without 
an immediate major treaty amendment. To 
this end London is already thinking about 
a so-called “Danish solution”, orientated 
on the agreement reached with Denmark 
in connection with the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht Treaty). The “Danish solu-
tion” arose in talks between Copenhagen 
and the then eleven other EC member 
states after the Danish electorate rejected 
the Treaty in 1992. After hard negotiations 
the heads of state and government – notably 
under British mediation – concluded an 
agreement promising Denmark opt-outs. 
Denmark, like the United Kingdom, was 
excluded from the third stage of economic 
and monetary union, and exempted from 
future EU integration in defence policy and 
in justice and home affairs. 
The heart of this solution was an inter-
national treaty signed by all the EU mem-
ber states and annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union, together with a binding 
promise to incorporate the substance of 
the annex in primary law at the next treaty 
amendment. After their inclusion in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Danish opt-outs 
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remain part of the EU treaties to this day. 
This outcome was achieved without the 
other EU member states having to undergo 
a separate ratification process, while the 
Danish government was able to muster 
sufficient popular support for membership 
under the new conditions to win a second 
referendum. Promises were also made to 
Ireland in 2008 after its negative referen-
dum on the Treaty of Lisbon, with conces-
sions granted within the scope of the exist-
ing treaties (Irish solution). For example the 
principle of “one commissioner per member 
state”, which had actually been abolished 
under the Treaty of Lisbon, was restored by 
decision of the European Council, permit-
ting smaller states like Ireland to continue 
to nominate a commissioner. Dublin was 
also promised that the Common Security 
and Defence Policy would not violate its 
neutrality. 
A similar solution would be conceivable 
for the United Kingdom. The now twenty-
eight member states would have to make a 
political declaration and conclude a treaty 
under international law, defining outcomes 
to be incorporated in the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union at some point after 2017. This 
would permit agreement to be reached 
before the British referendum, while allow-
ing the British question to be tackled sepa-
rately from reform of the Eurozone. That 
would also avoid giving London additional 
negotiating power in the form of a veto 
over EU treaty reform. 
It must be remembered, finally, that 
there are also limits to such an approach. 
The Danish and Irish solutions were only 
possible because all the opt-outs remained 
within the scope of the existing EU treaties. 
But as long as the agreement with the 
United Kingdom does not explicitly contra-
dict the treaty (for example by placing re-
strictions on freedom of movement), this 
would open a path to agreement within 
Cameron’s timeframe without referendums 
in other EU member states. 
A Tricky Balancing Act 
A closer look at what are currently the most 
urgent reform projects reveals that even 
without major treaty revisions there are 
certainly legal possibilities for the Union 
and the Eurozone to move forward and 
develop substantially. 
Yet the essentially political dilemma of 
EU reform, the neglect of political integra-
tion, cannot be resolved in this manner. 
Firstly, even with these instruments unani-
mous agreement among the nineteen Euro-
zone states – and in the case of the United 
Kingdom the twenty-eight EU member 
states – remains a necessary condition. 
Thus even if the hurdles of a major treaty 
reform, with its referendums and long 
timeframes, are taken out of the equation, 
it does not become significantly easier to 
achieve political agreement on concrete 
reform projects. Whether with a reform of 
primary law or without, the biggest politi-
cal challenge lies first and foremost in 
persuading the national governments to 
agree on the necessary reform initiatives. 
Secondly, the use of covert integration 
for substantive reform projects exacerbates 
the Union’s greatest long-term challenge, 
namely its lack of democratic legitimacy. If 
the perception that national governments 
are implementing integration by the back 
door without popular participation con-
tinues to consolidate, that would be grist 
to the mill of adversaries like the Front 
National in France, UKIP in the United King-
dom and others. Without the consent of the 
people the Union is condemned to failure 
in the long term. The numerous successes 
of euro-sceptics in the European elections, 
and above all the subsequent national elec-
tions, have already impaired the function-
ing of the Union. 
In order to resolve this dilemma and 
reform its structures, the European Union 
must accomplish a tricky balancing act 
under the most difficult of circumstances. 
Unforeseen turns aside, the medium-term 
political perspective will be dominated by 
three looming events: German Bundestag 
elections and French presidential elections 
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in 2017, and the British referendum in 
2016 or 2017. Until then covert integration 
remains realistically the only means to im-
plement necessary reforms in the Eurozone 
and achieve agreement with the United 
Kingdom. The combination of reaching a 
Danish solution with London and otherwise 
using the flexibility of the EU treaties as far 
as possible for the Eurozone could pave the 
way for actually tackling a treaty revision 
after 2017: to retrospectively legitimise the 
reforms introduced by covert integration, 
integrate extra-treaty elements like the 
Fiscal Compact into EU law, and complete 
outstanding expansions of powers. 
Germany can and should play a key role 
in this process. Not only does Berlin occupy 
at least a leading position in the Eurozone, 
if not in fact now a semi-hegemonic one. 
London also orientates its negotiating strat-
egy largely on Germany. If Berlin wishes to 
advance the Union’s development it needs 
to use these levers, above all to achieve the 
necessary political agreements in the short 
and medium term. And in the longer per-
spective the German government must de-
clare its willingness to tackle the challenge 
of a regular treaty amendment, including a 
Convention. 
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